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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RULON F. DEYOUNG, 
I 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970601-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether 
Appellant Rulon F. DeYoung was denied his constitutional right to 
counsel. 
i Standard of Review: "Whether a waiver of counsel was made 
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. 
We review the trial court's legal determinations for correct-
ness." State v. Heaton, No. 950238, slip op. at 4 (Utah May 1, 
1998). This Court will review the trial court's factual findings 
for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) . 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
DeYoung7s request for counsel is preserved in the Record on 
Appeal ("R.") at 448-49; 459; 652-53; 671; 686-87; 1083:4-9, 11-
12, 99, 152-53. Those pages from the record are attached hereto 
as Addendum A. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) (1995) . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 8(a) (1998). 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in the Court Below. 
The Utah State Tax Commission ("state") charged Rulon F. 
DeYoung ("DeYoung") with six counts of failing to make a tax 
return (third degree felony offenses), and six counts of willful 
evasion of income taxes (second degree felony offenses) for the 
years 1990 through 1995. (R. 9-13.) The case was tried to a 
jury, which found DeYoung guilty on all 12 counts. (R. 834-35; 
840; 849-50; 900-23.) The judge sentenced DeYoung to serve 
concurrent sentences for the offenses. (R. 961-72.) A copy of 
each judgment is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 26, 1996, the state filed an Information 
charging DeYoung with failing to make a proper tax return (third 
degree felony offenses) for the years 1990 through 1995, Counts 1 
through 6 respectively, and willful evasion of income tax (second 
degree felony offenses) for the same years, Counts 7 through 12 
respectively. (R. 9-13.) On the second day of trial in the 
matter, the judge amended Counts 1 through 6 by deleting the term 
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"proper." The amended counts charged DeYoung with "failing to 
make a tax return" for the subject years. (R. 1044:279.) 
During a preliminary hearing in the circuit court, and again 
during pre-trial proceedings in the district court, both the 
circuit court and the district court judges asked DeYoung about 
legal representation. (R. 448-49; 1083:4-11.) In both courts, 
DeYoung invoked his right to counsel and indicated he was unable 
to afford an attorney. (R. 448-49; 1083:5-9.) DeYoung asked 
that the judges appoint an attorney who was an expert in tax law 
to represent him in the criminal case. (R. 448-49; 1083:5-9.) 
The circuit and district court judges denied DeYoung7s request 
for an "expert" and ruled that DeYoung could represent himself 
with standby assistance from appointed counsel. (R. 450-51; 
1083:15; 303.) The circuit and district court judges failed to 
determine whether DeYoung intended to waive, or was waiving, his 
right to an attorney as guaranteed by the state and federal 
constitutions. The district court set the 12-count felony case 
for trial. (R. 1083:22.) 
! Prior to trial, DeYoung filed papers with the district court 
objecting to standby representation in the matter, and 
specifically asserting that he refused to waive his 
constitutional right to counsel. (R. 652-53 ("Accused Defendant 
I 
refuses to waive any right of counsel"); 671; 687 ("accused 
defendant does not waive any Constitutional rights including the 
right to counsel that defendant can repose confidence in").) The 
trial court overruled DeYoung's objections and ordered the 
3 
standby attorney to continue in that capacity. (R. 801; 1083:112-
16.) Additional facts relevant to the issue presented in this 
appeal are set forth below pursuant to the marshalling 
requirement. See Argument C , infra. 
During the trial, the state presented evidence that DeYoung 
owed a total amount in state taxes for 1990 through and including 
1995 of approximately $2,880. (R. 1045:39s.)1 The jury found 
DeYoung guilty on all 12 counts and the trial judge sentenced 
DeYoung to prison. (R. 900-23; 961-72.) He is incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During pre-trial proceedings, DeYoung requested the 
appointment of a tax attorney to represent him in the criminal 
matter. The circuit court denied the request, ordered DeYoung to 
represent himself, and appointed Robin Ljungberg ("Ljungberg") to 
assist as standby counsel. 
When the case was bound over to the district court, the 
judge conducted an on-the-record colloquy concerning DeYoung's 
ability to represent himself, and continued Ljungberg's 
appointment as standby counsel. Thereafter, DeYoung objected to 
the standby representation and specifically asserted that he had 
not waived his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal constitution, and Article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. The judge overruled DeYoung's 
objections and denied the request for direct assistance. 
Inasmuch as DeYoung was denied the right to be represented 
1
 DeYoung has since paid the taxes. 
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by counsel in the criminal proceedings, the trial court committed 
prejudicial error. A trial court is required to protect a 
criminal defendant's right to counsel. The trial court in this 
matter disregarded that obligation, compelling the entry of an 
order reversing this matter and remanding it for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
DEYOUNG WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 
A. AN ACCUSED HAS THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution provides, 
fI[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right...to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence."2 
The Utah Constitution affords the accused with "the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel." Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) (1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 8(a) 
(1998); see Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978). The 
United States Supreme Court considers the assistance of counsel 
to be "a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." 
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31. 
B. A VALID WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MUST BE KNOWINGLY, 
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE. 
In considering the right to counsel, courts must indulge 
"every reasonable presumption against waiver." "[We do] not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). "Because of the importance 
2
 The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 
(1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). 
5 
of the right to counsel and the heavy burden placed upon the 
trial court to protect this right, there is a presumption against 
waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the 
defendant's favor." State v. Heaton, Case No. 950238, slip op. at 
10 (Utah 1998) (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464). A copy of the 
slip opinion issued in Heaton is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
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 [B] efore the court may permit the defendant to proceed 
without the assistance of counsel, the court must conduct a 
thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring 
that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made." Heaton, slip op. at 10. 
The "thorough inquiry" consists of the following: 
The trial court should (1) advise the defendant of his 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well 
as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2) 
ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of 
the decision to represent himself, including the expectation 
that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter 
of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant 
comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the 
range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts 
essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
Heaton, slip op. at 10; see also State v. Probe1, 815 P.2d 724, 
732-33 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 n. 12 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah App.) ("Bakalov I"), rev'd on 
other grounds per curiam, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993); Johnson, 304 
U.S. at 464; U.S. v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987). 
This Court is able to review the issue of waiver only "after 
[the trial court] has conducted a meaningful inquiry of defen-
6 
dant. Therefore, in the absence of such a colloquy, this court 
will look at the record and make a de novo determination regard-
ing the validity of the defendant's waiver only in extraordinary 
circumstances." Heaton, slip op. at 11. "Extraordinary circum-
stances" shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.; see 
also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465 (the constitutional right imposes a 
"serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge" to 
determine whether waiver was intelligent); Gottschalk v. State, 
602 P.2d 448, 451 (Alaska 1979) (waiver of right to counsel must 
appear affirmatively on record and will not be inferred), cert. 
denied, 447 U.S. 920 (1979); Bench v. State, 743 P.2d 140, 141 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (right to attorney may be waived if done 
knowingly, intelligently, and will not be presumed). 
Even when a penetrating colloquy has been adequately 
conducted, a defendant may subsequently assert his right to 
counsel. "[A] defendant who waives the right to counsel is 
entitled to withdraw that waiver and reassert the right." U.S. 
v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 
U.S. 883 (1991). In that instance, the trial court is required to 
protect that right, and "no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, 
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Argersincrer, 
407 U.S. at 37. 
In this case, DeYoung did not specifically invoke the right 
to self-represent on the record. Notwithstanding, the trial judge 
engaged in a colloquy concerning self-representation. There-
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after, DeYoung specifically asserted his right to the assistance 
of counsel, which the trial court rejected. DeYoung's constitu-
tional rights were violated resulting in prejudicial error. 
C. DEYOUNG DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS REQUIRED TO APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT 
DEYOUNG IN THIS CASE. 
The marshalled evidence reflects that DeYoung7s right to 
counsel was violated in this matter as set forth below.3 
1. The Circuit Court Failed to Protect DeYoung7s Right to 
Counsel. 
In early proceedings before the circuit court, DeYoung 
asserted his right to counsel. He told the judge that he met with 
Ljungberg, who was appointed to represent him, and Ljungberg "ex-
pressed that he ha[d] represented one tax matter." (R. 448.) 
DeYoung claimed he was entitled to "expert counsel." He also 
stated, "I require assistance of counsel because I am not an 
attorney. I7m not representing myself as an attorney. I7m a 
citizen in party. Therefore, I7m entitled to my rights. And 
under the Sixth Amendment, I am entitled to counsel." (R. 448-
49.) 
The circuit court asked to hear from Ljungberg on the 
matter. He stated the following: 
I believe that Mr. DeYoung has a handle on the issues that 
he wishes to litigate. I would be willing just to act as 
standby counsel as far as the criminal procedure aspects, 
but I do believe that some of the defenses are going to be 
3
 Although the issue involves a conclusion of law, which is 
reviewed under a correctness standard providing no deference to the 
trial court, for the convenience of the Court appellant has 
marshalled the evidence. 
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defenses that Mr. DeYoung is going to have to argue and 
raise himself. This would not be something that I would be 
comfortable [ethically] in raising. 
(R. 449.) Although the circuit court judge made no explicit 
findings on the record, he implicitly found that DeYoung wanted 
to represent himself. (R. 450-51.) The judge ordered DeYoung to 
proceed pro se and Ljungberg to serve in a standby capacity to 
assist with procedural aspects and rules pertinent to the case. 
(R. 450-51.) The circuit court's ruling was incorrect as a matter 
of law for at least two reasons. 
First, DeYoung expressed concerns about Ljungberg's ability 
to represent him in a tax matter, and as a result of the concerns 
he was seeking the appointment of expert or alternative counsel. 
As a matter of law, those statements do not constitute waiver nor 
do they constitute an invocation of the right to self-represent. 
In the instance case, the record discloses that the 
defendant neither rejected the offer of court-appointed 
counsel, nor waived his right to counsel. His sole object 
was to secure a lawyer of his own choosing. Defendant's 
complaints did not require the trial court to inquire 
whether the defendant might prefer to represent himself. 
Felts v. State, 588 P.2d 572, 576 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); see 
also U.S. v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993), cert, 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 314 (1993) (requests for substitute counsel do 
not constitute waiver of counsel); U.S. v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 
1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994) (requests to self-represent accom-
panied by requests concerning "standby" counsel do not constitute 
waiver of right to counsel); U.S. v. Lussier, 50 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
1995); see also Heaton, slip op. at 3 (defendant stated he did 
not feel he was receiving adequate representation and attorney 
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expressed discomfort with defendant because of conflict; "Heaton 
did not" assert right to self-represent and the judge did not ask 
whether Heaton wished to waive right to counsel). Where there is 
no waiver, the court is required to appoint counsel to represent 
defendant. The circuit court erred in failing to do so. 
Second, the circuit court erred in that it failed to conduct 
a colloquy. " [B]efore the court may permit the defendant to pro-
ceed without counsel" it must conduct the on-the-record colloquy 
as set forth in Heaton, slip op. at 10-11, Frampton, 737 P.2d at 
187-88 n. 12, and Probe1, 815 P.2d at 732. (See R. 447-54.) 
[A]ppellant did not tender a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
his right to counsel. No colloquy was conducted to inform 
appellant, inter alia, of the permissible range of 
punishments, possible defenses, and the danger of 
permanently losing his right to assert defenses and other 
rights if they are not raised at trial. Rather he was 
merely given a choice between proceeding by himself or with 
counsel in whom he had no confidence[.] 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 626 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. 1993); see also 
Heaton, slip op. at 10-13. 
Notwithstanding the defects in the proceedings, DeYoung 
proceeded with the matter pro se and acknowledged that he was 
representing himself. (R. 198.) The record supports that standby 
counsel assisted DeYoung with procedural matters pertinent to the 
case while DeYoung handled substantive issues. During the course 
of the circuit court proceedings, DeYoung became frustrated with 
standby assistance. (R. 198; 454-56.) In a subsequent hearing, he 
reminded the judge of his request for "expert counsel." (R. 459.) 
The judge rejected DeYoung's concerns and again improperly 
ordered him to proceed with standby assistance. (R. 460); see 
10 
Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 1356; Meeks, 987 F.2d at 579. The 
circuit court's ruling deprived DeYoung of his constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel. Heaton, slip op. at 10-13. 
DeYoung does not assert on appeal that he was entitled to 
the appointment of "expert" counsel. Rather, DeYoung maintains 
that because he requested counsel, the circuit court was required 
to appoint an attorney to represent him. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 
at 1356. The court erred in that it failed to appoint direct 
assistance for DeYoung; it improperly ordered DeYoung to 
represent himself with standby assistance only. 
Even if this Court determines that the record in the circuit 
court was sufficient to support waiver of counsel, the circuit 
court erred as a matter of law in proceeding as it did since it 
failed to conduct the thorough colloquy identified in Frampton 
and Heaton. See Argument B., supra. The circuit court's actions 
violated DeYoung's constitutional right to counsel. 
The case was bound over to the district court in that 
posture. 
2. Although the District Court Engaged In an On-the-Record 
Colloquy, the Colloquy Was Defective as a Matter of Law. 
After the bind over, the district court considered DeYoung's 
representation issue. Specifically, the judge asked whether 
DeYoung wished to have Ljungberg represent him directly or as 
standby counsel. (R. 1083:4-5.) DeYoung stated, "[In the circuit 
court, the judge ruled] to the effect that I would be able to 
represent myself as a citizen in party and have Mr. Ljungberg as 
standby counsel." (R. 1083:4-5; see also 1043:10-11.) According 
11 
to case law, that statement did not constitute a waiver of coun-
sel or a request to proceed pro se. In Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 
1356, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that a defendant's numerous requests to self-represent, 
accompanied by defendant's insistence that the court appoint 
"standby" counsel, did not constitute a wavier of the right to be 
represented by counsel. Id. 
In DeYoung's case, the matter continued as follows: 
[DeYoung]: I do have an understanding that I have a right 
to be represented. I have asked the previous court for 
counsel that could represent me in regards to tax matter. 
[Court]: All right. It evidently has been determined that 
you do not have the funds available to pay for your own 
attorney to represent you. Is that correct? 
[DeYoung]: That is correct, Your Honor. 
[Court]: And so you need to have counsel appointed for you; 
is that correct? 
[DeYoung]: To my understanding, Mr. -- and with the 
understanding that I have with Mr. Ljungberg, he is willing 
to assist me in regards to the presence of the Court. Mr. 
Ljungberg expressed that morning in the meeting that there 
are certain issues that he would have problems in presenting 
before the Court. 
[Court]: I see. 
[DeYoung]: And, therefore, he is -- he admitted or agreed 
that he would assist. 
[Court]: All right. 
• * * 
[Court]: Now, Mr. DeYoung, I understand your position is 
that you would not mind, or -- well, that you would not mind 
having counsel appointed to represent you, but an attorney 
who is, in essence, a tax attorney or who has expertise in 
tax law; is that correct? 
[DeYoung]: I would -- I would hope to be able to have 
representation to the quality that I would be able to bring 
12 
forth the issues on the tax matters that I'm entitled to. 
Mr. --
* * * 
[Court]: Is it -- am I correct in understanding that you 
would not mind having counsel appointed to represent you so 
long as that counsel had expertise in tax law or was a tax 
lawyer, presumably with some criminal law expertise as well? 
Is that correct, Mr. DeYoung? 
[DeYoung]: That is correct, Your Honor. 
(R. 1083:5-9.) 
Significantly, DeYoung did not refuse to proceed with court-
appointed counsel in the district court. In fact, DeYoung did not 
have the assistance of court-appointed counsel there since 
Ljungberg was serving in a standby capacity. 
Likewise, DeYoung did not insist on proceeding pro se, and 
he did not waive his right to counsel. See Heaton, slip op. at 3 
("Heaton did not assert his right to self-representation, and the 
judge did not ask Heaton whether he wished to waive his right to 
counsel"). According to Heaton, Frampton, and Probe1, such 
conduct would trigger an on-the-record colloquy concerning the 
defendant's right to self-representation. See Argument B, supra. 
Next, the district court conducted a colloquy concerning 
DeYoung's educational background, age, and ability to speak, 
understand, and read the English language; whether DeYoung had 
ever represented himself in any other legal proceeding, how 
often, and the time frame; whether DeYoung was comfortable with 
his own representation (to which DeYoung responded, "to a 
point"); and whether DeYoung understood that he was entitled to 
"assist [] Mr. Ljungberg, if he were actually representing you and 
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was not just standby counsel." (R. 1083:9-11.) 
The court also asked DeYoung if he felt "reasonably capable 
of representing" himself, to which DeYoung responded, "I do." 
(R. 1083:12-13.) The trial judge ruled that DeYoung had the 
ability to represent himself and the matter would proceed with 
Ljungberg as standby counsel. (R. 303; 1083:14-15.) 
The colloquy was inadequate and improper for several rea-
sons. First, it was misplaced as a matter of law since DeYoung's 
statements concerning standby counsel did not constitute waiver 
of the right to counsel or an invocation of the right to self-
represent. See Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 1356; see also Heaton, 
slip op. at 10 (colloquy is triggered by defendant's invocation 
of right to self-represent or waiver of counsel). In addition, 
DeYoung specifically requested the assistance of counsel. (R. 
1083:7 (he "hope[d] to be able to have representation to the 
quality" that he could bring forth tax issues)); see 
Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 1356 (where numerous assertions 
concerning self-representation were accompanied by insistence 
that court appoint "advisory" or "standby" counsel to assist, 
defendant never waived right to be represented by counsel). 
Thus, the trial court was required to appoint an attorney to 
represent DeYoung in the matter. Taylor, 933 F.2d at 311. 
To the extent there was any ambiguity or doubt concerning 
DeYoung's request, the trial court was required to resolve all 
doubts in favor of DeYoung's right to counsel. Heaton, slip op. 
14 
at 10; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; U.S. v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 
216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986) (doubts concerning waiver of counsel 
must be resolved in defendant's favor). 
Second, assuming arguendo that a colloquy was appropriate, 
it was defective in this case as a matter of law. Here, the judge 
simply asked about DeYoung's educational background, experience 
in court, whether he was "reasonably capable" of representing 
himself, and whether he understood that if Ljungberg represented 
him, he could assist Ljungberg. That was not enough. 
In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
following: 
Although a defendant's background is relevant to his ability 
to waive his right to counsel, that background is not 
relevant to show whether a sensible, literate, and 
intelligent defendant possesses the necessary information to 
make a meaningful decision as to waiver of counsel. The 
fact that defendant is well educated, can read, or has been 
on trial previously is not dispositive as to whether he 
understood the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
self-representation in a particular situation. 
' I 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188 (footnote omitted). 
The judge was required in this matter to ascertain that 
DeYoung "comprehend[ed] the nature of the charges and proceed-
ings, the range of permissible punishments," "additional facts 
essential to a broad understanding of the case," and the risks 
and consequences of the decision to self-represent. Heaton, slip 
op. at 10; Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88; Probe1, 815 P.2d at 732. 
"It is the trial court's duty to determine whether the defendant 
does in fact understand the rights being waived and the potential 
consequences." Bakalov I, 84 9 P.2d at 63 6. Here, the colloquy 
is devoid of such matters; it does not reflect a knowing, intel-
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ligent waiver of counsel. The trial court erred in ordering 
DeYoung to proceed pro se. The analysis in DeYoung's case ends 
here since the colloquy was defective as a matter of law. 
If the colloquy is inadequate, this Court may look to the 
record to determine the validity of the waiver only in 
"extraordinary circumstances." Heaton, slip op. at 11. DeYoung's 
case does not present such circumstances. 
Assuming arguendo "extraordinary circumstances" existed 
here, a review of the record reflects that DeYoung did not 
understand the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of self-
representation. For example, first, DeYoung did not understand 
the nature of the charges. He was never arraigned on them 
(compare R. 295-96; to 1083:2-29 in general),4 and he filed 
several motions in an effort to comprehend the nature of the 
charges. (See 216-19; 235-38; 312-15; 250-75; 342-57; 651-73.)5 
Second, DeYoung did not understand the rights being waived 
and the potential consequences. For example, although DeYoung 
attempted to present an opening statement, he drew so many 
objections that he eventually waived it. (R. 1045:451-53.) 
Third, DeYoung had no opportunity to understand the "range 
of permissible punishments" if convicted of the 12 felony 
4
 The trial judge entered a minute entry after the March 10 
hearing that stated DeYoung was arraigned on all charges and 
entered a "not guilty" plea. (R. 295-96.) The record of the hearing 
does not support the minute entry. On March 10, 1997, the parties 
asked the judge to arraign DeYoung on the charges. (R. 1083:2-4.) 
The judge agreed to do so but never did. (See R. 1083: 2-29.) 
5
 The trial judge denied DeYoung's motions (R. 607-09), then 
on the second day of trial ordered the state to amend Counts 1-6 
since they failed to track statutory language (R. 1044:278-79.) 
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offenses. Heaton, slip op. at 10. The penalties were not 
explained to him on the record and he was not informed before 
trial that he may be sentenced to prison if convicted. See 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 (in the absence of specific 
colloquy, record must show that defendant "knew the possible 
maximum penalty"). 
In fact, the trial judge represented to DeYoung at 
sentencing that if he paid delinquent taxes, the judge would urge 
the board of pardons to consider DeYoung for parole. (R. 1046:33; 
see also 984-85; 982) ; see note 1, supra. The judge later 
reversed that ruling sua sponte as a penalty to DeYoung for 
filing a "frivolous" motion, which the court stated represented 
an "obvious unrepentant attitude and frame of mind." (R. 985.) 
Fourth, DeYoung did not understand the risks in proceeding 
pro se. Indeed, the "frivolous" motion is one example of the 
numerous papers filed by DeYoung without understanding the risks. 
DeYoung filed several other papers asking the court to take 
action on issues that had already been resolved, and he filed 
papers that the judge deemed to be irrelevant, non-meritorious, 
or untimely. (See R. 359; 611-12; 642-43; 648A-49; 834; 935-36; 
976; 984-85; 988; 1038.) Those filings demonstrate that DeYoung 
did not know or understand the disadvantages of self-
representation. 
Inasmuch as DeYoung was not an attorney and did not have 
prior experience with representing himself in formal court 
proceedings, the case presented complicated issues, where 
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professional training and experience normally would be desired.6 
If convicted DeYoung faced the possibility of serving an 
indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in prison for each 2nd degree 
felony offense, and 0 to 5 years in prison for each 3rd degree 
felony offense. That possibility became a reality when DeYoung 
was sentenced to serve concurrent terms for 2nd and 3rd degree 
felony offenses. (R. 961-72.) The trial court's failure to advise 
DeYoung of the nature of the charges and "the range of 
permissible punishments," among other things, rendered the 
colloquy inadequate. Heaton, slip op. at 10. 
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as 
a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits 
associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in 
order to represent himself, the accused must "knowingly and 
intelligently" forgo those relinquished benefits. Although a 
defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of 
a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose 
self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record 
will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his 
6
 DeYoung needed the professional assistance of a criminal 
defense attorney. While DeYoung was concerned with Ljungberg's 
lack of experience in "tax matters" (R. 448), Ljungberg properly 
saw the case as a criminal matter. (R. 1083:109.) Ljungberg had 
the experience and training to address the criminal and statutory 
issues presented. Because Ljungberg was never required to take 
direct responsibility for the case, DeYoung was never given the 
opportunity to realize the value of Ljungberg's direct assistance. 
(See R. 1083:103 (DeYoung complained that Ljungberg maintained 
"that as standby counsel, the accused defendant must do what the 
defendant must do to present a defense"); R. 1043:157 (trial court 
described standby counsel role as "standing by and not actually 
doing it"); 449-51 (circuit court appointed Ljungberg as standby 
counsel to guide DeYoung "as far as the criminal procedure aspects" 
of the case).) 
In sum, the practical effect of denying DeYoung's request for 
counsel was to further exacerbate the very frustration which com-
pelled him to seek counsel -- DeYoung believed that Ljungberg 
lacked the ability to address the substantive issues. Yet, Ljung-
berg was not required to address those issues as standby counsel. 
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choice is made with eves open." [Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.] 
While the record establishes defendant's decision to proceed 
pro se was voluntary, the question remains whether his 
choice was made knowingly and intelligently. 
Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956 (emphasis in original). 
Throughout the trial court proceedings, DeYoung made state-
ments to the effect that the lower courts had ruled he could 
represent himself in the matter. (See R. 198; 1083:4-5; 1043:10-
11.) Such statements are irrelevant in determining as a matter of 
law whether DeYoung knowingly and intelligently waived counsel 
and chose to represent himself. Absent extraordinary circum-
stances, that determination can only be made with an adequate 
colloquy where the trial court has ascertained that defendant 
comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range 
of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to 
a broad understanding of the case. Heaton, slip op. at 10-11. 
Where the colloquy is inadequate, the trial court has failed 
as a matter of law to properly ascertain whether defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Heaton, 
slip op. at 12-13; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Where the trial 
court has failed to obtain a knowing waiver, it is required to 
appoint counsel to represent defendant in the matter. Heaton, 
slip op. at 12-13. The court in this case conducted a defective 
colloquy, failed as a matter of law to obtain a knowing and 
intelligent waiver, and failed to appoint counsel to represent 
DeYoung in the proceedings. The trial court deprived DeYoung of 
his constitutional right to counsel. This case should be reversed 
on that basis for a new trial. 
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3. In Later Proceedings, DeYoung Specifically and 
Unequivocally Invoked His Right to Counsel Prior to Trial. 
After the initial colloquy in the district court, DeYoung 
filed three documents stating that he was "refus[ing] to waive 
any right of counsel." (R. 652-53; 671.) Papers filed with the 
trial court on July 25, 1997, stated the following: 
COMES NOW Accused Defendant, to notice the above captioned 
Court that accused defendant does not waive any 
constitutional rights including the right to counsel that 
defendant can repose confidence in. Accused defendant 
cannot repose confidence in standby counsel Robin K. 
Ljungberg for the following reasons and therefor requests 
the appointment of counsel that accused defendant can repose 
confidence in. 
1. Standby counsel will not return phone calls promptly. 
2. Standby counsel will not schedule appropriate meetings 
to discuss trial strategy. 
3. Standby counsel has no knowledge of the taxing statutes. 
4. Standby counsel has no knowledge of what the subject of 
the tax is and therefore is unable to advise the accused 
defendant as to a defense strategy. 
5. Standby counsel has refused to explain the nature and 
cause of the accusation against the accused defendant. 
(R. 686-87.)7 
On August 7, 1997, the trial judge held a hearing concerning 
Deyoung's "objection to standby counsel and request for the 
7
 DeYoung"s request for counsel that he could "repose confi-
dence in" was reasonable. In other contexts, case law reflects that 
a relationship which would induce a reasonably prudent person to 
repose confidence and trust in another merely consists of a 
confidential relationship. See Johnston v. Goss, 106 F.3d 413 
(10th Cir. 1997); Brooks v. Martin, 69 U.S. 70, 78 (1864) ("The 
principle is a general one, and it applies to 'all cases where 
confidence is reposed, to agents, attorneys, solicitors, 
guardians,' &c." (emphasis added)); Black's Law Dictionary 270 (5th 
ed. 1979) ("Confidential relation" is defined as one which exits 
"between client and attorney." "It covers every form of relation 
between parties wherein confidence is reposed by one in another" 
(emphasis added)). In the event the trial court had "doubts" 
concerning DeYoung's requests, all doubts were required to be 
resolved in favor of his right to counsel. Heaton, slip op. at 10; 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220. 
20 
appointment of new counsel." (R. 1083:96.) There, DeYoung 
stated, "I wish to point out that I want the contract of those 
constitutional rights. I want to make sure that this Court is in 
agreement, that we have joinder of party. That under the 
constitutional rights, on the first hearing March 10th, the Court 
recognized that I would have constitutional rights, therefore, I 
am demanding those constitutional rights." (R. 1083:99.) 
The court interrupted and reminded DeYoung, "first of all, 
you have constitutional rights as a criminal defendant. They 
include many things such as the right to counsel, if you choose 
to have counsel --." DeYoung responded with "Thank you, Your 
Honor." (R. 1083:99.) The judge continued to identify 
additional rights, then informed DeYoung that she wanted to hear 
his objections, which he identified.8 (R.1083:101-04.) 
Thereafter, the court rejected DeYoung's request for the 
appointment of counsel as follows: 
All right. Mr. DeYoung, with regard to your objection 
and the merits of your objection, as I indicated to you, the 
law is that in a criminal case, you have the right to be 
represented by counsel. If you can afford counsel, you may 
retain counsel at your own expense, anyone you choose who is 
authorized to appear in this court in behalf of you. You 
8
 During trial, the judge identified the role of standby 
counsel as limited to "standing by and not actually doing it when 
you're representing yourself." (R. 1043:157.) That role is similar 
to the role the circuit court approved, where Ljungberg agreed to 
act as standby counsel "as far as the criminal procedure aspects" 
of the case. (R. 449.) Ethically, Ljungberg was not obligated to do 
more since he was not directly representing DeYoung. See Utah R. 
Prof. Cond. 1.2 (1998); U.S. v. Taylor, 933 F.2d at 312-13. 
DeYoung did not complain that Ljungberg was ineffective in his 
limited capacity as standby counsel. Rather, DeYoung asserted that 
he needed direct assistance. Where Ljungberg served as standby 
counsel, such assistance was not enough. 
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have the right to be represented by counsel if you cannot 
afford counsel and -- and I would appoint counsel to 
represent you, if you could not afford counsel, and I 
understand that [] is your situation. Because you chose to 
represent yourself, then courts are -- you may have standby 
counsel to assist you. And you do not have the right to a 
particular attorney. . . 
My concern here is that -- first of all, one of the 
concerns that you have is that Mr. Ljungberg has no 
knowledge of the taxing statutes. I've read your pleadings 
as we've gone along, Mr. DeYoung, and you have very specific 
views about the taxing statutes based on -- and on the 
constitution. I couldn't agree more that you have the right 
to have the views that you have. I respect that you have 
the right and those views may be unique to you, for that 
matter, or -- but I certainly am profoundly respectful of 
your right to have the views that you have. 
But because you have certain views, and you know I've 
disagreed with you at different times since this case has 
started, about what the law says whether your views are 
correct as a matter of law, and I have disagreed with your 
view of the law at times, I -- and I think that is the 
situation that you are in insofar as someone not having 
knowledge of the taxing statutes. 
• * * 
What appears to me here is that the problem is not a 
lack of knowledge of the taxing statutes but, rather, a 
disagreement about what the law says insofar as this 
criminal case is concerned. And that [] has existed between 
you and the Court, and I perceive [] there's been a 
difference in view of that"between you and Mr. Ljungberg. I 
don't think that [] has made Mr. Ljungberg incapable or 
incompetent to assist you. 
Mr. DeYoung, you are entitled to represent yourself in 
this case, as you have chosen to do, and you are entitled to 
argue the law as you understand it to the Court. And if 
that differs from the view of the law that an attorney has, 
then you do have the right to advance your position to the 
Court. 
With regard to [your complaint that] phone calls [were] 
not returned, it appears to me that, given this basic 
difference of opinion about what your views are and what Mr. 
Ljungberg's understanding of the law is, that the phone 
calls being not returned relate more to the fact that he 
doesn't believe he can be of assistance to you in your 
pursuit of your understanding of the law as it pertains to 
some issues. And not because he's indifferent to your case 
or incompetent in some way. 
The number of hours represented to the Court seem to be 
well within reasonable bounds for a case of this type, and 
there doesn't seem to be any difference of opinion about --
that Mr. Ljungberg has been able to answer your questions 
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about criminal procedure as opposed to responding to 
questions you have about -- that arise directly out of your 
view of the constitution. . . 
With regard to the -- for example, your complaint that 
he has refused to explain the nature and cause of the 
accusations. I have heard your arguments about that. I have 
not agreed with your view of the law about the specificity 
of the elements of the offenses with which you have been 
charged. And likewise, well -- I don't see that there is an 
incompetency here in any respect on the part of Mr. 
Ljungberg. 
(R. 1083:112-115.) The court also expressed reluctance in 
appointing new counsel one week before trial. (R. 1083:115.) 
The district court failed to make explicit findings in 
connection with DeYoung's requests. However, it implicitly found 
that DeYoung was "[choosing] to represent [himself]." (R. 
1083:112-14.) 
That finding is not supported by any underlying facts, and 
is clearly erroneous. In addition, it is incorrect as a matter 
of law. A request for substitute counsel does not constitute a 
waiver of the right to counsel nor does it constitute invocation 
of the right to self-represent. Meeks, 987 F.2d at 579 (request 
for substitute is not equivalent of waiving the right to 
counsel); Kienenberger, 13 F.3d at 1356 (request tci standby is 
not the equivalent of a request to proceed pro se). 
Indeed, DeYoung was expressly seeking the enforcement of his 
constitutional right to counsel. (R. 652-53; 671; 686-87.) The 
trial court was required as a matter of law to appoint an 
attorney to represent DeYoung; it erred by failing to do so. 
DeYoung attempted again to make his point to the trial 
judge: During those same proceedings, he requested that he be 
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allowed to have a paralegal with him at counsel table. The judge 
denied that request. DeYoung summarized the ruling with a 
reference to the trial court's denial of his right to counsel: 
The only question that I would come up with, not in an 
argumentative manner necessarily, I do understand the law is 
that this is a right-to-work state and, likewise, when 
you're precluding the right of individuals to come into the 
court to represent themselves and to have assistance of 
counsel, that is my direction and that's what I'm asking 
for, and that could be a whole different other matter to be 
determined. 
(R. 1083:152-53 (emphasis added).) 
On the day of trial, DeYoung reminded the court that he had 
"pled before the Court that [he] have assistance of counsel with 
regards to tax matters" (R. 1043:118), and that "Mr. Ljungberg 
admits readily that, on tax issues, tax matter[s], tax law, he is 
not fully acquainted." (R. 1043:119.)9 DeYoung's requests for 
counsel went unheeded. 
Before a trial court may continue with proceedings against a 
defendant, it must show that defendant was offered direct (not 
standby) assistance and intelligently and understandingly 
rejected that assistance. Anything less in the record is 
inadequate. See Taylor, 933 F.2d at 311. 
In Taylor, the trial court granted the defendant's request 
9
 During trial, the judge advised DeYoung that although 
Ljungberg was available in a standby capacity, she would permit him 
to examine witnesses if DeYoung preferred. (R. 1043:161.) DeYoung 
declined the offer and proceeded with examining the witnesses. That 
was the obvious choice, since the trial court rejected DeYoung's 
request for counsel, ordered DeYoung to represent himself, and 
continued Ljungberg's involvement simply in a standby capacity, 
where Ljungberg would be expected only to stand by and he would not 
be expected to be prepared to proceed to trial as though he were 
directly representing the defendant. (See R. 449; 1043:157.) 
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to represent himself and appointed a public defender to assist as 
standby counsel. The public defender played an active role in the 
trial. Id. Defendant nevertheless was convicted. Prior to 
sentencing defendant requested the appointment of defense 
counsel, and the trial court denied the request, ordering the 
public defender to continue in the standby capacity. Id. On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reversed the conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in 
denying defendant his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 
Id. 
In U.S. v. Holmen, 586 F.2d 322, 324 (4th Cir. 1978), defen-
dant proceeded through trial pro se, then moved to withdraw his 
waiver of counsel prior to sentencing. The district court denied 
the motion and sentenced defendant. The government conceded error 
and the sentence was vacated and remanded in order that defendant 
could be represented by counsel at his sentencing. Id. 
In this case, the trial court was required to provide 
DeYoung with direct assistance when he requested it prior to 
trial. The court's failure to provide counsel in that instance 
violated DeYoung7s constitutional rights. 
D. DEYOUNG'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE 
APPOINTMENT OF STANDBY COUNSEL. 
Standby counsel may be available to aid the accused if and 
when he requests help, and take over representation if it becomes 
necessary to terminate the self-representation. However, as long 
as counsel assists in a standby capacity, s/he "does not 
represent the defendant." Taylor, 933 F.2d at 313 (emphasis in 
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original) . 
Given the limited role that a standby attorney plays, we 
think it clear that the assistance of standby counsel, no 
matter how useful to the court or the defendant, cannot 
qualify as the assistance of counsel required by the Sixth 
Amendment. There can be no question that the roles of 
standby counsel and full-fledged defense counsel are 
fundamentally different. The very definition of full-
fledged counsel includes the proposition that the counselor, 
and not the accused, bears the responsibility for the 
defense; by contrast, the key limitation on standby counsel 
is that such counsel not be responsible -- and not be 
perceived to be responsible -- for the accused's defense. 
Id. at 312; Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1231 (5th Cir. 
1997) ("We emphasized in Taylor that ' [s]tandby counsel does not 
represent the defendant7 . . . Rather, his role is one of an 
'observer, an attorney who attends the proceeding and who may 
offer advice, but who does not speak for the defendant or bear 
responsibility for his defense'"). 
The right of an accused to counsel is not satisfied by 
standby assistance. The accused is entitled to the assistance of 
a competent member of the bar, who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interest of the defendant and present 
such defenses as are available to him under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the profession. Alires v. Turner, 
449 P.2d 241 (Utah 1969). 
In Bakalov I, this Court indicated that standby assistance 
preserves the defendant's right to self-representation while 
ensuring "that the defendant cannot later appeal, claiming that 
he or she did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to 
counsel." Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 637. That statement should not 
be misconstrued. This Court specified that standby assistance 
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serves important functions where the trial court has properly 
found that defendant has chosen to self-represent, but the court 
harbors serious reservations about the ability of defendant to 
effectively do so. Once a defendant has exercised the right to 
proceed pro se, he cannot later claim that the quality of his 
defense amounted to a denial of "effective assistance of 
counsel." Id. and n.8. DeYoung's case does not present that 
situation. 
Inasmuch as the colloquy in this case was defective as a 
matter of law, and inasmuch as DeYoung affirmatively asserted to 
the trial court that he had not waived his right to counsel, 
there was no basis for finding that "defendant ha[d] knowingly 
and intelligently chosen self-representation." Bakalov I, 849 
P.2d at 633. According to Frampton, Heaton, and Taylor, the 
trial court was required to appoint counsel. By proceeding with 
standby assistance, the trial court violated DeYoung's 
constitutional rights. See Taylor, 933 F.2d at 311-13. 
E. THE REMEDY HERE IS A NEW TRIAL. 
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one 
charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance 
with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to a [] court's authority to deprive an 
accused of his life or liberty. When this right is properly 
waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary 
element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction 
and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by 
counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his 
constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a 
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence 
depriving him of his life or his liberty. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467-68; see also State v. Bakalov, 
862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) ("Bakalov II") ("Judge Greenwood's 
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ruling [in Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 637] to reverse and remand for 
a new trial was legally correct"). A violation of the right to 
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment constitutes error, 
where defendant is not required to show prejudice. Taylor, 933 
F.2d at 312-13. Thus, the trial court's failure to provide an 
adequate colloquy and its failure to provide DeYoung with direct 
assistance of counsel constituted reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's implicit finding that DeYoung chose to 
represent himself was clearly erroneous, and the conclusion of 
law that he waived counsel was incorrect. Since the trial court 
ordered DeYoung to proceed only with standby assistance, his 
constitutional right to the direct assistance of counsel was 
violated, compelling the entry of an order reversing this case 
and remanding the matter for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this PiLJjL, day of W l * ^ , 1998. 
LINDA M. JONES 
Standby Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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8 mind, talking about representation of counsel. 
9 MR. DEYOUNG: I would like to, for the record, 
10 declare that this court is a common law court. 
11 THE COURT: Well, you've made your 
12 declaration. Let's talk about whether you want 
13 counsel • I disagree with you, but left* go i.u ie 
14 appointment of counsel. 
15 M R . DEYOltt . i Well
 f 1 :,l .Hid LT" J'^ ' *:4e 
16 sovereignty of the flag; and therefore, jurisdiction 
17 is obviously different from
 t -1 \i i, i a r i scl i,»-
1B! point We don't have a jury under Federal Rules of 
1 C i v i l i r Dtenui*' 7 b n hi , I M M h<jp)ir tn nddrpss H I M 
2 0 matter uf representation. 
21 I've met with Mr. Youngberg this
 m0rning. 
22 Mr. Youngberg has expressed that he has represented one 
2 3 i,ax, ma Lnej", and it - my understanding that I am 
24 entitled to expert counsel. I require assistance of 








1 representing myself as an attorney, I'm a citizen in 
2 party. 
3 Therefore, I'm entitled to my rights. And 
4 under the Sixth Amendment, I am entitled to counsel. 
5 THE COURT: But your right to counsel does not 
6 include the right to a particular type of counsel or to 
7 a particular expertise held by counsel. And the United 
8 States Supreme Court has made that abundantly clear. 
9 You're not — I'm sure you're not entitled to someone 
10 who might by training or experience be entitled to 
11 proffer himself or herself an attorney that's a tax 
12 lawyer, for example. Mr. Youngberg, what's your take 
13 on this? 
14 MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, big complication, 
15 Judge. I believe that Mr. DeYoung has a handle on the 
16 issues that he wishes to litigate. I would be willing 
17 just to act as standby counsel as far as the criminal 
18 procedure aspects, but I do believe that some of the 
19 defenses are going to be defenses that Mr. DeYoung is 
20 going to have to argue and raise himself. This would 
21 not be something that I would be comfortable in 
22 raising. 
2 3 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, and I suspect that 
24 you're not going to be comfortable with raising it 
25 because you feel that it would breach an ethical duty 
1 MR. DEYOUNG: I requested on the 10th of 
2 January when I appeared for roll call --
3 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
4 MR. DEYOUNG: — a-
5 counsel in regards to tax matters. A related to the 
6 C o u r t at I li.it I. Mm.1 , I miot* w i t h Mr Vuuiiqberg, 
7 Mr. Youngberg told me that he had only represented one 
8 o t h e r l. -i.« in a t1 e f I n • e. c o g n i z e t h a t M t , 'iloungben i, i , a n 
9 excellent criminal attorney and certainly is very 
10 proficient in that regard, but he admitted directly 
11 that he had very little knowledge of the tax law. 
12 And vhe Y meet with him on the 8th in 
13 his office, he immediately referred to the fact that my 
14 mimhpr«•. were totally against me in regards to the Court 
15 and the opposition or the opposing counsel and that I 
1 6 vi rtually cannot win in this matter. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, of course, Have no 
18 way of knowing whether that, the evaluation of the 
19 case, is correct know is * - -. d 
20 here, what I've gotten right now, I presume that you're 
2 1 i n n o c e n t . Y o u <A r < • e n t i 1 1 e d I " > I > \'" i • < J i e x t *•i n d t o 
2 2 you, the same presumption of innocence that I would 
2 3 extend to -, in y *\ i: im i na ,1 defendant :i n this courtroi 
24 you have it, believe me. So I have no way of knowing 
25 , Youngberc evaluation i '- correct It 
1 6 
Item # 2) Prosecution is withholding evidence as requested under Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 16(e) of which correspondence copies are attached (Exhibits 1. 4. 5. 7. 8. 8(a) 
and 9). Plaintiff/Prosecutor has denied Accused Defendant due process rights of full disclosure 
under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16, Discovery. 
Item #3) Accused Defendant requested under Rule 16(e) to have a list of 
employees/supervisor(s) which have directly or indirectly been involved in the decision making 
process as to certain determinations by the Utah State Tax Commission or Internal Revenue 
Service that Accused Defendant is a "taxpayer" and "subject to" a income tax under the Internal 
Revenue Code and Utah Code Annotated. This request was denied by Prosecutor Winegar as 
evidenced in the response letter of June 25, 1997 (Exhibits) and phone call conversation between 
Mr. Winegar and Accused Defendant on the morning of June 23,1997 (Exhibit 3) as averred in the 
letter to Mr. Robin K. Ljungberg dated June 26, 1997 (Exhibit 2). Denied the defense of 
inspection, testing or copying discovery from the source that must have documentation, records, 
statements, rulings and personnel which has created a dilemma for the court, in that defense shall 
require considerable more time for examination in behalf of the defense during trial. Accused 
Defendant finds it most interesting that Mr. Winegar pledges equal protection under due process of 
the fundamental law on paper, only to suppress it, disparage it and flat out deny it while generating 
allegations. 
Item #4) In a letter dated on June 26, 1997 (Exhibit 21 Accused Defendant demanded from 
Court Appointed Standby Counsel, Robin K. Ljungberg the exact nature and cause of the 
accusations made (letter attached, Exhibit 2). Accused Defendant refuses to waive any right of 
Judicial Notice Under Rule 201; Rule 16(g); and Sunshine Law (Exhibits that were to be attached) 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 2 of 3 plus attachments 
ij 
counsel, in as much as Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Wade S. Winegar, the Third District Court, 
under the honorable Judge Ann M. Stirba and Court Appointed Standby Counsel for Defense, 
Robin K Ljungberg are considered to be ineffective in providiing the exact nature and cause as 
required under The above said Constitutional Laws. 
Accused Defendant hereby respectfully submits the attached copies of the letters ^outlined in 
items # 2 through 4 which are indicated within the original Judicis 
16(g); and Sunshine Law as filed with the at love Court < 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, hereby certify that I mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDICIAL 
NOTICE UNDER RULE 201; RULE 16(g); AND SUNSHINE LAW^EXPLANATION OF 
ATTACHED EXHIBITS), by depositing the^same in the U.S.lnai^ postage prepaid or 
delivering in person on July 17, 1997 addressed tiytne following: 
Jan Graham, Esq. (1231) 
Attorney General 
Scott Reed, Esq. (4124) 
Kirk Torgensen, Esq. (4927) 
Wade S. Winegar, Esq. (5561) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Dated: July 17, 1997 
Judicial Notice Under Rule 201; Rule 16(g); and Sunshine^Law (Exhibits that were 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
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under due process of the fundamental law on paper, only to suppress it, disparage it and flat out 
deny it while generating allegations. 
4) In a letter dated on June 26, 1997, Accused Defendant demanded from Court Appointed 
Standby Counsel, Robin K. Ljungberg the exact nature and cause of the accusations made (letter 
attached). Accused Defendant refuses to waive any right of counsel, in as much as Counsel for the 
Plaintiff, Mr. Wade S. Winegar, the Third District Court, under the honorable Judge Ann M. 
Stirba and Court Appointed Standby Counsel for Defense, Robin K. Ljungberg are considered to 
be ineffective in providing the exact nature and cause as required under The above said 
Constitutional Laws. 
5) Defendant's Court Appointed Counsel, Robin K. Ljungberg has neglected, failed or refused 
to inform the Accused Defendant or provide to Defendant the exact nature and cause of the 
accusation for a proper defense. 
6) Defendant's Court Appointed Counsel, Robin K. Ljungberg is unable to identify the subject 
of the income tax (what is being taxed). In the absence of Mr. Ljungberg's ability to identify 
exactly what the so-called income tax is, Mr. Ljungberg is unable to render assistance in the 
formulation of a valid comprehensive and effective defense strategy as appointed by the Utah State 
Third District II Court and Utah State Third District Court and bound over. 
7) The honorable Judge Ann M. Stirba is unable, fails, refuses, or neglects to inform Accused 
Defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation and has no knowledge of what the subject of 
the so-call income tax is, being that the above Court remains the jury's sole source of the law, 
therefore the honorable Judge Stirba is unable to be effective in making a proper determinations as 
Judicial Notice Under Rule 201; Rule 16(g); and Sunshine Law 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 3 of 5 
e o c e 71 
JJ P:; L 
J* 
American Flag or Peace (Title 4 VS.C. $1) 
Rulon Frederick, De Young 
C/O 3475 Highland Drive #A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 487-4142 
Robin K. Ljungberg, Standby Counsel 
Third District Court 
Utah State 
State of UiaJi 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Rulon Frederick, De Young 
Accused Defendant 
Inc. Case No. 971900227 FS 
OBJECT TO CONTINUANC! 
STANDBY COUNSEL 
Judge Ann M. Stirba 
NOTICE 
Responsibility Disclaimer under U.C.C. 3-501: Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a) the case titled above 
is under the Title 4 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, American Flag of Peace. This Case is under the Jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Const., art. Ill, §§1 and 2. No Admiralty or Maritime Jurisdiction will be allowed in the 
Jurisdiction of the above captioned case. No titles of nobility under any foreign flag jurisdiction and 
in breach of U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, will be allowed in the Jurisdiction of this case. Breach of this 
contract will cause sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). If the Constitution of the united States is 
surrendered to a foreign power to cause the breach of contract, of Oath and Affirmation, to the 
Constitution of the united States of America, then charges for perjury of Oath and Constructive 
Treason, and contempt for the Constitution of the united States of America, will be brought against 
the Officers of the Court responsible. 
No review of this Motion will be allowed (Hake v. Clarke. 91 F. 3d, 1129 (8th Cir 1996)), acceptance 
of this Motion by the Clerk of this Court constitutes a contract guaranteeing Plaintiff a U. S. Const. 
amend. VII jury trial. Breech of this contract can cause an additional action against those who cause 
such breech. 
Objection to Continuance of Standby Counsel 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 1 of 2 
6 0 C 6 S G 
COMES NOW Accused Defendant, to notice the above captioned Court that accused defendant 
does not waive any constitutional rights including the right to counsel that defendant can repose 
confidence in. 
Accused defendant cannot repose confidence in standby counsel Robin K. Ljungberg for the 
following reasons and therefore request the appointment of counsel that accused defendant can 
repose confidence in. 
1. Standby counsel will not return phone calls promptly. 
2. Standby counsel will not schedule appropriate meetings to discuss trial strategy. 
3. Standby counsel has no knowledge of the taxing statutes. 
4. Standby counsel has no knowledge of what the subject of the tax is and therefore is unable 
to advise the accused defendant as to a defense strategy. 
5. Standby counsel has refused to explain the nalrae-^ffldxaus^ accusation against the 
accused defendant. 
Accused Defendant requests a "Marsderi 
earliest convenience. 
Dated: July 25,1997 
Objection to Continuance of Standby Counsel 
Case No. 971900227 FS 
Page 2 of 3 
Ruloh Frederick, De Young 
Citizen in Party 
Accused Defendant 




























indicated a desire to represent himself, and that's 
something that we need to clarify today, obviously. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: It's my recollection that he was 
arraigned at that level. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: I don't specifically remember that, 
to be frank. If we could just get that taken care of so 
there's no question. 
THE COURT: All right. Certainly. Mr. DeYoung, 
is Mr. Ljungberg your counsel or do you wish him to be 
standby counsel for you? 
MR. DeYOUNG: Your Honor, on our January roll 
call before Judge Nehring, it was determined in that 
hearing that, in meeting with Mr. Ljungberg that morning, 
Mr. Ljungberg was not a — familiar with tax law. And 
seeing that the charges by the State in this matter is 
pertaining to tax law, there are several issues that I have 
as a defense that I would like to present before the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, we're not talking 
about those at this time. 
MR. DeYOUNG: I understand that. 



























MR. DeYOUNG: And, at that point, you see, 
Judge Nehring did rule to the effect that I would be able 
to represent myself as a citizen in party and have 
Mr. Ljungberg as standby counsel. 
THE COURT: I see. Mr. DeYoung, I'd like you to 
be sworn in. Would you raise your right hand to be sworn 
in? 
(Whereupon, the oath was administered 
to the defendant by the clerk.) 
MR. DeYOUNG: To the best of my ability. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeYoung, I just want 
to make sure that you understand that you have a right to 
be represented by counsel in this criminal action against 
you. Do you understand that you have a right to be 
represented by an attorney? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I do have an understanding that I 
have a right to be represented. I have asked the previous 
court for counsel that could represent me in regards to tax 
matters. 
THE COURT: All right. It evidently has been 
determined that you do not have the funds available to pay 
for your own attorney to represent you. Is that correct? 
MR. DeYOUNG: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And so you need to have counsel 


























MR. DeYOUNG: To my understanding, Mr. — and 
with the understanding that I have with Mr. Ljungberg, he 
is willing to assist me in regards to the presence of the 
Court. Mr. Ljungberg expressed that morning in that 
meeting that there are certain issues that he would have 
problems in presenting before the Court. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. DeYOUNG: And, therefore, he is — he 
admitted or agreed that he would assist. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Winegar? 
MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, I don't know if there's 
ever been a finding that he is indeed indigent and needs 
representation. At the first appearance, the judge gave 
him representation of counsel, and — 
THE COURT: Well, also, I believe that LDA has 
its own screening as to that status; is that correct? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: We generally have — the State 
requires that we have an — not an affidavit, but an 
information form thatfs filled out by our clients that does 
indicate whether or not they're indigent. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm not trying to 
open up that door. I don't usually. And I don't have any 
basis presented to me on which to unappoint Mr. Ljungberg— 





1 THE COURT: I'm not planning to proceed on that 
2 today. If there is some evidence to support that, then we 
3 could have a hearing on that. However, I would advise you, 
4 Mr. DeYoung, that if you do have the means to retain 
5 counsel, you have the right to retain an attorney at your 
6 own expense. But since Mr. Ljungberg has been brought in 
7 by Judge Nehring as counsel or to assist you with this 
8 case, I111 assume that there's an appropriate basis for 
9 that and proceed. 
10 Now, Mr. DeYoung, I understand your position is 
H that you would not mind, or — well, that you would not 
12 mind having counsel appointed to represent you, but an 
13 attorney who is, in essence, a tax attorney or who has 
14 expertise in tax law; is that correct? 
15 MR. DeYOUNG: I would — I would hope to be able 
16 to have representation to the quality that I would be able 
17 to bring forth the issues on the tax matters that I'm 
18 entitled to. Mr. — 
19 THE COURT: My question was — 
20 MR. DeYOUNG: Judge — 
21 THE COURT: — simply answerable by yes or no. 
22 MR. DeYOUNG: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: And my question was: Is it — am I 
24 correct in understanding that you would not mind having 
25 counsel appointed to represent you so long as that counsel 
had expertise in tax law or was a tax lawyer, presumably 
with some criminal law expertise as well? Is that correct, 
Mr. DeYoung? 
MR. DeYOUNG: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Then — however, 
Mr. DeYoung, by contract, LDA are the attorneys available 
to the court for appointment in cases. And this is a 
criminal case. And I'm not aware of any other attorney at 
LDA who has the kind of expertise that you were looking 
for. 
Is that correct, Mr. Ljungberg? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: I've made some inquiry, Judge. 
The only attorney that's — that's even been involved in 
any sort of accounting or tax issues would be Miss Stam, 
and it's been about 2 0 — 15 years ago, something like 
that. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: And so she — she would not, I 
don't think, meet criteria as an expert in tax matters at 
this point. 
THE COURT: And there's no — the only departure 
from appointing LDA is if there is a conflict of interest 
within LDA, and then there are contract attorneys. But as 
I understand it, there's no conflict that's being raised 
here that would preclude LDA from appearing in this case. 
8 
Is that correct, Mr. Ljungberg? 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Up to this point there has been 
no — 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: — conflict of interest, I don't 
believe. 
THE COURT: Mr. DeYoung, not having before me the 
colloquy between you and Judge Nehring, I'm going to be 
asking you some questions about your ability to represent 
yourself. Now, you do have the right to appear in your own 
defense, if you wish. You have the right to be represented 
by counsel also. So, if you wish to be represented by 
counsel rather than conduct your own defense, you certainly 
have the right to have that occur. 
You do not have the right to have a specific 
attorney appointed to represent you, or even one with 
specific tax background, and there are several reasons for 
that, one of which is that — are the framework of which we 
have LDA and other attorneys available to the court. This 
is how the appointment process works. I can't simply call 
on -somebody else and appoint somebody else merely because 
you wish to have someone with — with some tax background. 
But, what is your educational background? 
MR. DeYOUNG: I have three years of college. 
THE COURT: And, how old are you? 
Mr. Ljungberg to assist me, so that I would be well within 
the procedure and the rule of the court. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
you could — if he represented you, if you preferred that, 
he would still be representing you but that you would be 
assisting him in your representation as a client. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. DeYOUNG: You're — you're saying that I 
would not be opted — 
THE COURT: No, no — 
MR. DeYOUNG: — to proceed at representing 
myself and having standby counsel? 
THE COURT: No. That's not what I meant. Let me 
state this in a different way. 
Do you understand you also have the option of 
assisting Mr. Ljungberg, if he were actually representing 
you and was not just standby counsel? In other words — 
MR. DeYOUNG: I — I can understand that. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 
you have that right? 
MR. DeYOUNG: That is an option. 
THE COURT: All right. And, you've thought about 
this, have you? About whether that is — representing 
yourself is a better way for you to proceed, in light of 
your concerns and your issues? 
11 
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1 MR. DeYOUNG: Well, if I understand Mr. Ljungberg 
2 correctly, there are matters that he would be uncomfortable 
3 in presenting in my defense. And I feel that I definitely 
4 have a defense that should be raised before the Court. 
5 THE COURT: I see. 
6 MR. LJUNGBERG: That is accurate, Judge. There 
7 are some legal arguments that I would feel uncomfortable, 
8 in an ethical setting, presenting as fact. And so I think 
9 that's why Mr. DeYoung and I came to this compromise. 
10 THE COURT: I see. 
H Mr. Winegar? 
12 MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, the only concern that 
13 the State has — with people that, in the past, I've known 
14 tax protesters, they seem to want to fight a paper war. 
15 Between the filing of charges and the preliminary hearing, 
16 we had about twenty motions, all of which were denied. And 
17 since the bindover we have had three motions, one of which 
18 we need to address is a notice of deposition and a summons 
19 to a tax investigator and other people. We've got a real 
20 problem with him following the rules of criminal procedure 
21 and just deluging us with — with paper that — he'll cite 
22 Army regulations and this 4 USC 1 flag of peace and all 
23 these different things that are really irrelevant, 
24 completely irrelevant, to these matters. And we would ask 
25 that there be at least some mechanism in place so that we 
12 
the flag this morning. I am ready to hear what you have to 
say about your objections to Mr. Ljungberg as standby 
counsel, so proceed with that. You may proceed. 
MR. DeYOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor. I wish to 
point out that I want the contract of those constitutional 
rights. I want to make sure that this Court is in 
agreement, that we have joinder of party. That under the 
constitutional rights, on the first hearing March 10th, the 
Court recognized that I would have constitutional rights, 
therefore, I am demanding those constitutional rights. 
And ~ 
THE COURT: You have constitutional rights as a 
criminal defendant, Mr. DeYoung, there is no question about 
that. You may proceed with your — 
MR. DeYOUNG: Thank you. 
THE COURT: — argument about your objection. 
MR. DeYOUNG: May I just qualify that, that I 
have — are you saying all? 
THE COURT: Mr. DeYoung, first of all, you have 
constitutional rights as a criminal defendant. They 
include many things such as the right to counsel, if you 
choose to have counsel — 
MR. DeYOUNG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: — the right to a speedy trial, the 



























like — I don't want be in a position of looking or 
sounding like I'm making a suggestion in any way as to what 
the State should or should not present. That's not my job. 
And it's — my job is simply to determine what the law 
says, and then make sure that the conduct of the trial is 
consistent with that. So any other questions? Any other— 
we have the subpoena issue to deal with. Do you have any 
other questions, Mr. DeYoung? 
MR. DeYOUNG: Prior to going into the subpoenas 
Your Honor, the direction that I had hopes to obtain is — 
is that I would request assistance also from a person of my 
choice to sit at the table to assist with us as we are 
going through the trial. 
THE COURT: You have standby counsel. You may 
not have anyone else to assist you who is not an attorney 
at counsel table. 
MR. DeYOUNG: Okay. The only question that I 
would come up with, not in an argumentative manner 
necessarily, I do understand the law is that this is a 
right-to-work state and, likewise, when you're precluding 
the right of individuals to come into the court to 
represent themselves and to have assistance of counsel, 
that is my direction and that's what I'm asking for, and 
that could be a whole different other matter to be 
determined. 
152 
1 THE COURT: Well, it won't be. It will be 
2 determined now. You are not entitled to have anyone else 
3 sit with you at counsel table besides your standby counsel. 
4 End of discussion. That is the ruling. 
5 MR. DeYOUNG: Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: With regard to — let me just say 
7 this. When you ask for equal protection, what you're 
8 asking for is that I, in essence, rule the same way insofar 
9 as the State. Absolutely, the same applies to the State. 
10 For example, Mr. Winegar would not be permitted to put on 
H any evidence as to what the law is if it's different from 
12 what I've said the law is. You see? That's how it's 
13 consistent. Do you understand? 
14 MR. DeYOUNG: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Now, any other questions? 
16 All right. I hear none. With regard to the subpoenas, 
17 you've presented these subpoenas — do you wish to make any 
18 comment with regard to them at this time or do you want to 
19 reserve your comments after Mr. Winegar speaks? 
20 MR. DeYOUNG: I'll reserve. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Winegar. 
22 MR. WINEGAR: Your Honor, just a couple of 
23 points. Mr. DeYoung has submitted numerous subpoenas to 
24 the Court. Once we received those subpoenas and a witness 
25 list, we sent him a letter asking him for a summary proffer 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 8. Appointment of counsel. 
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self represen-
tation, and if indigent, has the right to court-appointed counsel if the 
defendant faces a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 














.to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being ntf legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted by Qr a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea ofno contest; of the offense of V a \ \ \ v n A Tr\ H 1 f l K ^ ~ " f ^ j f ffififlTj , a felony 
of the 2 — degree, • a class misdemeanoi^eing now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented b y r r o S / & , ^ i j m | y j f o and the State being represented byl^-M > PftfaiLQ 
of the above offense, i^ noviTsMeriCed to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
in coun ana r 
> n : C T 
(is now adjudged guilty 
• / to a maximum mandatory term of 
H not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; 
years and which may be life; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of 
$I21LU_?5% screhawj^ 
\a and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of &*2&CP^j& l u £ > I \A~*&f£ 
\A?&f&5> f 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s). 





.are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached cond i t io i ^ f probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the 
/
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned ija accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. ^--rtrr-- ^ 
Commitment shall issue TOrHVlU; I T T ^ 
DATED this A day of
 w 1^/VW^^ , 1 §Z_ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page _ 
(white-Court) (Green-Judae) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Golrienrnd-State) 0 0 0 9 61 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




 rw^ (frictocxn 
ftnlftn f. ]><yumA I count NO. J t 
Hnnnrahta fir)T\f f Q k S f I f & O 
4 R)invl Clerk Cfy|,„ 
Bailiff KtltVfVT - I J , -C 
Defendant. • Date ^ ^ 7 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the^next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There beinq/no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant-having been convicted by Q a jury^Q the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea of/io contest; of the offense nff(\\ \\ Wy fc P f l f l £^ H ^ . K ^ T ^ H O , a felony 
of the 3 degree, Q<a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented byl and the State being represented b*LWi I l£#Vis now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense/isnowsentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: V 
• / to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
Gd not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; 
Sf and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
/ such sentence is to run concurrently with. 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, Q Court, Court(s) . are hereby dismissed. 
Q 
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adtjtt Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions/rfprobation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Uf for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in^ccordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue rOYrnU) \ r n 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
I T d a y o f J J r U f o r i & D 
DISTRICT COURT JUD 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page <U. of I cft-a 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) 
0 ^ 6 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 




Count Nn IXC- _ ^ 
Clerk. 
Reporter. 
Bailiff K f l ' f£ 
1>>V") )WMt lO'.OOnn 
Defendant. Date. ip§ &u 
• The motion of. .to enter a judgement of conviction for th£ next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There beincr no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant Jiving been convicted by Q a jury^Q the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea of.no contest; of the offense of fr^PA TO P O r t ^ ^n^T^r^X1^ , a felony 
of the degree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in 
represented ty| 
of the above offense, fe now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
. u  l  i r, i   r t in court and ready for sentence and 
vf)% I K - . ^ J M W A and the State being represented bylC/ W\WQTAC\S now adjudged guilty 
, fe nOW Sentenced tO ^ tPrm in thp I Itah £tato Pricnrv ^ 
• / to a maximum mandatory term of 
Of not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; 
years and which may be life; 
2.>i<&>r7 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of fll/LXJ h p&iO --*^ ^ X/ 
Q and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
J such sentence is to run nnnmrmntlywith fr|W CtilY)^ \ *\ Hh\<Z M &s 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s). 
• 
_are hereby dismissed. 
/ 
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult^ Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditionspf^robation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Qftor delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
x confined and imprisoned iaaccordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
• ^ Commitment shall issue vcV^U \ju iH~V>> /7\
 A . - v 
DATED this \ day nf ^/fPW^^ , 19 9 ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: < 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) 
P a
^°<-$r 0 9 g 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





Clerk. " ~ 
R e p o r t e r . ^ ^ 
Bailiff fajTP, Jk^A^ 
Date. 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Or aiury; Q^the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea of.no contest; of the offense of t(\\ \\X\£i 4 p n O f l M ^ KAV ^ i v r Q a felony 
of the $&*.. degree, D a class misdemeanofHleing now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented byT itfpQ |K^t]fV\blf4and the State being represented hy(/D. yiftvmVfis now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is Viow'serit^ ncBa to a term in the Utah State P r i s o n : ( J 
• / to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
bd not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / " not to exceed years; ^^
 y , 
S/ and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ t Q £ H ± \oSC/0 OJfQh&V^J 
Q and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
/ such sentence is to run concurrently with . 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
/
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditionspf^robation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Q f fo r delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
/ confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
51 Commitment shall issue fzjv^VKuJ \ V W 
DATED this / daY of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
"OURTJUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page ^ 1 of [oS^ a a (j r- < 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





I id l l l u l l , 
rg1 
niPrk tT)/w* uWirm 
. Bailiff u l m ^ p ^ 
Defendant. I Date ^ ^ j ^ 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There beina/no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendanLfaavjng been convicted by ID a jury; CLthe court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea oft no contest; of the offense of T7\l prift , a felony 
of the,o degree, • , a class misdemeancV being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented byjo^^eJK^\)n^nt(Cj. and the State being represented bjl> UJinflffl now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, \4 now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: \J 
• / to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
Sfl not to exceed five years; -7. ^ I &0 & "7 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; . ^-oH? 
ST and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $\Dl)Q^h<S^&70 SfjT(Lr^(^J 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
j such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) \ are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
/
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of AdulJ Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditionspfprobation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County QKfor delivery to the 
/ U t a h State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in, accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue ror^Vuu \yF\ C 
DATED this /, day of ^ JyfV^P^ , 1 9 1 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page Q of [rJ^ 
0 0 0 0 S ^  (white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) ° J J " *^ ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Won f- &^,rtf [ S^^.Th rA^ 
Clerk M^f l t JMmO 
ter, ' U j Repor terJ . 
* Bailiff H l ^ h -L>,l 
Defendant. • D a t e —al^ L 
A. 
3 ^ 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being/(o legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendantJiaying been convicted b y ^ ^ a j u r y ; ^ the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea ofno contest; of the offense of r A ^ i n A TQ W&kfi I f o ^ f f i j y r A ,
 a felony 
of the y dearee^UL a class misdemearW, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented bylT ft ^ 2 I fc^mhf,VWv and the State being represented b y ^ ( i f r y f f i C i s now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, \k now se/rtenred to a term in the Utah State Prison: "7"! 
• X to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
03 not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; . 
Of and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of dODf) t %&6fO ^ U ^ f ^ ^ ^ J 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
J 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) . are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
/ period of , pursuant to the attached conditions^ffprobation. 
121 Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Ei for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
/
confined and imprisoned ir>accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue rOt^vMU 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
such sentence is to run concurrently with 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
0 0 0 9 f) fi (white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) " J ' -* v- V / 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




 r,^ OThpHTOStl vs. ^ I case N Q [ / ; + . - -
mlon f ^ILIMVCL- I countNo^J^rm CZL^ 
1
 I J y\ 1 Hnnnmhta * H h W (Yl rtf.f\Dk > Clerk W f f l U f e g 
Reporter \/> ft l f \ - I f l - . L D f t m 
Railiff -Kfl T W I 4 \ / i / > 
Defendant. n,tp <aaap7 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being/fio legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havina been convicted by^Q a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of M U n J l fcxlA'oinO ^^YitOVntL^XC ,
 a felony 
of the *21— degree. • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented byfffi 7* £ ^ \ ) m | ^ y#t and the State being represented b j /J . \/J>V>7^iis now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, Is now sWntenSed to a term in the Utah State Prison: (J 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
• / not to exceed five years; ^ . "2-1 <?b £"7 
Of of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
Q / not to exceed years; 
Sf and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ \l{lf)0 t ; # 5 # ? ^ U r e h a f ^ O 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
/ such sentence is to run concurrently with 
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
/
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions^probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County El for delivery to the 
/ U t a h State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. / confined and imprisoned in accordance wit 
u Commitment shall issue fe^nUJl^fn 
DATED this J day of I / } 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: G 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page / of 1 c>pr
 r ,. . 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




 ^ qn\gno9sn vs. —. • Case No. i t i ^ i J\JCT^ , 
KO ftfl h Q p u o n r v ^ ^ I count NO.
 A ^
T X T ~ V _ 
Clerk V Y ) ^ l / U ^ V } 
Reporter U M ft ^ 10 - 0 Uft .V >^ 
Bailiff fo'l^h J ^ ) / > 
Defendant. • Da te- '^p )4 7 
Q The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being/(o legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having heen copvicted by m a j^ury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea ofno contest; of the offense of 1A) \ \ \ f I ) 1 p\/rtf>\ g i ) JVC Jpnt firrvJL ~ f c K , a felony 
of the 3ree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
P r q M & ^ f ^ l / f l and the State being represented h^\[h<\oaf\!^. i 
fense, fe now sentenced to a term in the Utah State P r i s o n : ( J 
represented byrrCfyp { f^ <\Qp£{c\ and the State being represented bft/.[(/iftyfflT , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above off , 
Q to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
• / not to exceed five years; P n,^n 
C3 of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; ^ > - ^ o 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; . 
Of and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ \lpQO fr $&tO ^VS^hOSff^ 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
/ s u e , sentence is * ™n concurrent* w»h. flrhty r flew fa in V-hte ray 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
Q upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) . are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
/
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions^probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Of for delivery to the 
/ U t a h State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned ip, accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue R K i V \ U *ty^> Ir , / 
DATED this M day c«J\f y]fMs^s
 % 1 9 ^
; 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
f-C Deputy County Attorney Page J of ,. 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




.. CO . ^firta. 
Clerk IT lcCt W ' n n , 
Reporter J YTl flt g f l n ) 0 WS 0 A T^ 
Railiff ^ £ ^ O ^ J A / W / 
Date_ apa 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havina beeirconvicted by^a a4ury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea ofrio contest; of the offense of V J i H r m £ i l Q 6 i f y ftf ^nt^mA ~JCAST , a felony 
of the jree, • a class _ ^ misdemeanor, being now present in. court and ready for sentence and 
represented X$\and the State being represented byfy^ l IAJ> nflfflfts now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, i^  now s^errtfeneecl to a term in the Utah State Prison: (J 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
• / not to exceed five years; y ^ I /?0 cf *7 
S3 of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• - of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; i n r^n*U L ,W? 
El and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ l^QO \\ 0\$D *^V&ft&X9& 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to _ j such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• . 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
/
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions^Tprobation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County ^ 3 for delivery to the 
/ U t a h State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned iaaccordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue nTtHVllXH^ w 
DATED this Ji day oj 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
ft 0 0 Of ! 0 (white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) v ° 'J -' ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE 
^ (COMMITMENT) 
fr, ^ < ' a i n * I Case No. ^ O Q ^ T ? 
bjft WTf\ L 
Defendant. 
Clerk i}\(g |.U)VTTi 
Reporter)JlA|COT , " 
Bailiff KoxVm, L\)\<^ 
Date. 
ter vjipleg-^, fO'flflfljEI 
Mm ' Q|^^"? 
Q The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There beingyno legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havinabeen convicted by M a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea of wo contest; of the offense of [ ) J i ) l n ) l f x iA f t l&n ^ ^ j > ) ^ p ^ ° ~~T^K)C , a felony 
of the / f E degree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented byfcO9 \ ^ Mf l f fof it), and the State being represented ^ ( D f o l f f i l f i s now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, i i i v " 
ass misaemeanor, oeing now present in court ana r< 
l ^ f r f f l  t  t t  i  r r t  t ^ l ( 0 t o f t y 
SCTtehced to a term in the Utah State P r i s o n : ( J 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; ~ ^ 
• / not to exceed five years; 2- 2- V. o 0 o / 
El of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• / not to exceed years; . ^^ 
Car and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of & \lQ(Y) i f 9 6 /0 Silf^hC^OffCs 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
U such sentence is to run concurrently with f)rnC )f f / O m h lY"> ^fh ffS CCt?<C> 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with. 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) \ are hereby dismissed. 
• 
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions/Jt probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County lid for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned \n accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue fo^tU^H 
DATED this \ day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: L , 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page i Uof \J^ 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Golden rod-State) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






* I caseNo^hMimsa 
Clerk flQflf U)iV>Q 
Defendant. 
Reporter \ft(jjl L U I 0 : OPA fO 
Raiiiff -Kg-fS^n ^ ^ - L -
Date ^ gq p i 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havinabeen convicted by Q a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• ple^of no contest; of the offense o f U ^ ) m ? \ £\J(lS\Qf\ fff -foflDPfl,?. lC\Y , a felony 
of the Z^I/dQgree, • , a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by T ffl V J t^iiy^p/|ft and the State being represented b%[h\ IJjTiQ^i^is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, isl now^ serrienefed to a term in the Utah State Prison: Tj 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
• / not to exceed five years; ^ ^ l Sb &*7 
C2 of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
Q/ not to exceed years; ^ , ^* 
Q and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ W&ITS f ftSYfl 5UXQnOJ^<S 
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
/ such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
/
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions^ erfprobation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County dr for delivery to the 
/ U t a h State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned ip, accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue TO^LUlJi) * 
DATED this \ day o ^ 4 ^ 3 C ^ v • 1 9 ^ 2 / 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page I | of 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Goldenrod-State) ' ^ t } ( \ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




i. . _ < ^ I Case No.. 
( U O n f . L ^ p l h - r W I Count No FT" 
aiiQtvrzsn 
Defendant • Da t f t 
Honorable _MdajGi_ 
Clerk HOP ftif L\l)T)r) . 
Reporter' \JAt£- IQ\Q0C{ 
4 / 4 ] ^ 
• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the,next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being rto legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havino.been convicted by \ J a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea ohno contest; of the offense of ID) 11 Fv) \M A4i nTi g f ^fynftxr* TflVf ,
 a felony 
of Xhe]j-— dearee, • i a cjass , misdemeanor, being now present in qourt and ready for sentence and 
represented by«j 
of the above offense, id now set 
;o i , \J\ ii i^ u n k n o t ? V-M u v i u..v i.Y. / y* v u \ w » w I i / 'j ^ *—n w ' v^ • r w \ >- , a i^iwuy 
3,  l c
^ L ^ J r - ^ Y g \ and the State being represented byOuUL^Qi^^Yls now adjudged guilty 
; ~ Ktefteed to a term in the Utah State Prison:^ Jj 
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Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judgment entered on 
a jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, and evading arrest, a third degree felony. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
: Because some of the dates corresponding to the facts in 
this case are critical to the resolution of this appeal, we 
provide a detailed chronological summary of the relevant events. 
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for the robbery 
of an Albertson's grocery store in Roy, Utah. The next day, 
Heaton waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was bound 
over to district court. Heaton was a parolee at the time, and on 
July 26, he was returned to the Utah State Prison for violating 
his parole. Heaton also qualified for public assistance and was 
appointed counsel from the public defender's office. On 
August 2, Heaton appeared in district court for arraignment, at 
which time he pleaded "not guilty" to the charges and the judge 
set a pretrial conference for August 30 and a jury trial for 
September 9. On August 25, while incarcerated at the prison, 
Heaton filed a written request for final disposition of all 
matters pending against him pursuant to Utah Code Ann"". § 77-29-1 
(the "detainer statute"), which requires the prosecutor to bring 
pending charges against a prisoner to trial within 120 days from 
the date the notice is delivered to certain state officials or 
their agents. An authorized agent at the prison received 
Heaton's notice on September 3.1 
At his pretrial conference on August 30, Heaton 
requested a preliminary hearing, which he had initially waived. 
The prosecution had no objection, and the parties and the court 
agreed to hold a preliminary hearing on September 9, the date for 
which the trial had initially been set. At the September 9 
preliminary hearing, the court found that probable cause existed 
and set a second arraignment for September 27. At the second 
arraignment, Heaton requested that the judge recuse himself on 
the basis that the judge had also presided over Heaton's 
preliminary hearing. The judge recused himself and ordered the 
case reassigned. However, as a result of an error in the 
district court clerk's office, the case was not reassigned. In 
late November 1994, after receiving inquiry by a witness 
regarding the trial date, the prosecutor contacted the district 
court for a status report, whereupon the clerk's office 
discovered the error and reassigned the case to a different judge 
as previously ordered. 
On November 28, the district court sent the parties a 
notice of a trial-scheduling conference set for December 7. At 
that conference, the court initially attempted to set the trial 
date for January 19, 1995. However, because both defense counsel 
and the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict, the court set the 
trial for the next available date suitable for all the parties, 
February 16 and 17, 1995.2 
Subsequent to the trial-scheduling conference on 
December 7, 1994, Heaton sent a letter to the court requesting 
1
 The prosecutor's office received the notice on 
September 8. The record does not indicate whether the district 
court received Heaton's detainer notice; however, the prosecutor 
stated that he believed the court probably received the notice on 
September 8, 1994. 
2
 Defense counsel and the prosecutor were working on another 
criminal trial in mid-January. 
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new counsel. On February 8, 1995, the court held a hearing to 
address Heaton's request, which was based in part on his defense 
counsel's refusal to bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to the 
detainer statute. The court denied Heaton's request.. On 
February 16, 1995, after reevaluating Heaton's claim, Heaton's 
defense counsel moved to dismiss pursuant to the detainer 
statute. The court, however, found that at least 60 days of the 
71-day delay—i.e., the period between the second arraignment and 
the trial-scheduling conference—were attributable to the 
administrative error in the clerk's office. This delay, the 
court concluded, constituted "good cause" under the statute, and 
the court therefore denied the motion. 
Although originally scheduled for February 16 and 17, 
1995, the trial was not actually held until April 20 and 21, 
1995.3 Before trial, Heaton filed a pro se motion requesting 
that the judge recuse himself and requesting new counsel. A 
hearing was held on April 19, 1995, and the judge denied both 
requests. 
During the hearing, Heaton indicated that he did not 
feel he was receiving adequate legal representation and that he 
felt forced to proceed on his own. His attorney indicated that a 
"rift" had developed between them, that he was uncomfortable 
going to trial because of the "total conflict" between them, and 
that he thought Heaton wanted to represent himself. Heaton did 
not assert his right to self-representation, and the judge did 
not ask Heaton whether he wished to waive his right to counsel. 
Instead, the judge (1) advised Heaton of his right to self-
representation, (2) refused to permit Heaton's counsel to 
withdraw, (3) indicated to Heaton that he was requiring counsel 
to remain as standby counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the 
assistance, and (4) indicated that Heaton was free to choose to 
handle trial matters on his own but that the court would make a 
record of Heaton's decision to proceed pro se. 
Although Heaton's defense counsel assisted Heaton in 
selecting the jury, Heaton represented himself at trial. The 
jury convicted Heaton on both charges, and he was sentenced to 
serve concurrent terms of five years to life and zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison, such terms to be served 
consecutively to any sentences Heaton was already serving. 
On appeal, Heaton alleges the following errors: 
(1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
3
 The reasons for the trial delay from February to April are 
not pertinent to this appeal. 
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pursuant to the detainer statute; (2) he was denied his 
constitutional right to counsel; (3) he was denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; and 
(4) the prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument 
constituted reversible error. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's decision to deny Heaton's motion to 
dismiss was based on its legal conclusion that under the detainer 
statute the clerk's administrative mistake could excuse the 
prosecutor's duty to bring Heaton's charges to trial within the 
120-day period. Because this is a legal, rather than a factual, 
conclusion, we review the trial court's decision for correctness. 
£££ State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) . 
Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly and 
intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. We review the 
trial court's legal determinations for correctness. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994); Harding v. Lewis, 834 
F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1987). 
ANALYSIS 
Heaton first argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute. 
That statute provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state 
any untried indictment or information, and 
the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or 
any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, 
he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date 
of delivery of written notice. 
(3) After written demand is delivered 
as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his 
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counsel, for good cause shown in open court, 
with the prisoner or his counsel being 
present, mav be granted anv reasonable 
continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not 
brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is 
not supported bv good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (emphasis added). 
In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the district 
court made the following ruling: 
[T]his Court is going to deny the Defendant's 
[motion on] the basis that I believe that 
there has been good cause[.] And that term 
doesn't quite fit in this situation, but 
explainable cause shown as to why the delay 
occurred. And the Court does not find in any 
way that it was as a result of the 
prosecution's dragging its feet. 
The facts are that the bulk of the 
delay, 60 days at least of it, was the fault 
probably of the Clerk's office in this case. 
And again I don't know whether that fits into 
what could be called a good cause shown, but 
the Court believes that it happens from time 
to time, that there can be that kind of a 
glitch. 
And certainly the Defendant could have 
pushed to find out why his case had not been 
set for trial. [He] [c]ould have pushed his 
counsel to make that request, [a]nd was in 
the same position [as was] the State . . . . 
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The case sat. And it is unfortunate it 
did, but the Court will deny the motion at 
this time. 
The district court's ruling contradicts section 77-29-1 
and our prior case law. The statute requires the prosecutor "to 
have the matter heard within the time required." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1(4). Moreover, this court has consistently held that 
the language of the detainer statute clearly places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecutor. See Petersen, 810 
P.2d at 424; State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, 160 
(1969). In Petersen, the trial court asked the defendant whether 
the trial date was acceptable, and the defendant did not object 
to the date, which was outside the 120-day period. Nevertheless, 
this court concluded that the defendant was not required to 
object to the trial date in order to maintain his rights under 
the statute because the burden of bringing the case to trial 
within the disposition period rested solely with the prosecution. 
810 P.2d at 424. Thus, in the case at bar, the court clearly 
erred in concluding that Heaton was in the same position as was 
the State and therefore shared some of the responsibility to find 
out why his case had not been set for trial. 
The trial court further erred in its legal conclusion 
that the 71-day delay, most of which was occasioned by the court 
clerk's error, constituted "good cause" and thereby relieved the 
prosecutor of its burden under the statute. We first note that 
the judge's finding that the State did not contribute to the 
delay carries little significance. The mere fact that the delay 
was not caused by the prosecutor has never been considered 
dispositive because "to hold that good cause is supported by the 
lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would 
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the 
burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution." Id. at 
426; see also Wilson, 453 P.2d at 159-60 (reversing trial court's 
decision not to dismiss, notwithstanding fact that prosecution 
did not cause delay). 
The State argues that while it could have followed up 
on the ca'se earlier, "defendant cites no precedent for 
attributing to the prosecutor the responsibility for anticipating 
or preventing unexpected and infrequent administrative mistakes 
made by court personnel." We agree with the State that it is not 
responsible for the administrative mistakes of the court. 
Nevertheless, it JLS_ responsible for complying with section 
77-29-1. Because the statute places on the prosecutor alone the 
burden of bringing the case to trial within the 120-day period, 
the prosecutor's duty must be independent of the court's 
docketing system. While Heaton's case fell victim to an 
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administrative "glitch" at the clerk's office, his case also fell 
through a crack in the prosecutor's office. Even though the 
prosecutor's office received Heaton's detainer notice on 
September 8, 1994, neither the briefs nor our review of the 
record indicates that the prosecutor even addressed Heaton's 
detainer notice to the court until February 16, 1995, after the 
disposition period had already expired. When a prisoner delivers 
a written notice pursuant to the detainer statute, the prosecutor 
has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty 
to notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to 
make a good faith effort to comply with the statute. This is not 
to say that the prosecutor must succeed, for "good cause" may 
support the prosecutor's failure to comply. However, where the 
prosecutor's failure is inaction—in this case, doing nothing 
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory 
period—the trial court may not conclude that the prosecutor's 
failure is supported by "good cause." 
Nevertheless, even if the lower court erred in its 
legal conclusions, this court may affirm a trial court's decision 
on any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for 
affirmance finds support in the record. See K & T, Inc. v. 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); Hill v. Seattle First 
Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Deciding whether the 
district court properly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the detainer statute requires a two-step inquiry. 
First, we must determine when the 120-day period commenced and 
when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-
day period, we must then determine whether "good cause" excused 
the delay. 
The detainer statute clearly provides that the 120-day 
period commences on the date the written notice is delivered "to 
the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); see 
also State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) (holding 
that 120-day disposition period commences from date of delivery 
of written notice to warden, not from date defense counsel files 
notice of appearance) . However, this court has held that when a 
prisoner himself acts to delay the trial, he indicates his 
willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial. 
Thus, the disposition period must be extended by the amount of 
time during which the prisoner himself creates the delay. See 
State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982) (concluding 
that where defendant's trial date was originally scheduled less 
than one month after defendant's request for disposition and 
court granted defendant's request for continuance, defendant was 
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responsible for number of days during which continuance was 
granted and could not include those days in disposition period) . 
In the case at bar, the 120-day disposition period 
commenced on September 3, 1994, because that is the date on which 
an authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's written 
notice. However, Heaton did cause a trial delay. As set forth 
above, the court initially scheduled trial for September 9, 1994. 
At his pretrial conference on August 30, Heaton requested a 
preliminary hearing, which he had initially waived. The 
prosecutor having no objection, the court granted Heaton's 
request, changing the trial date to the preliminary hearing date. 
But for Heaton's request for a preliminary hearing, his case 
would have been brought to trial on September 9, just 6 days 
after his written notice had been delivered. Thus, Heaton 
delayed his own trial and indicated his willingness to 
temporarily waive his rights under the detainer statute. See 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116. 
When the court changed Heaton's trial date to the 
preliminary hearing date, in effect it continued Heaton's trial 
pending the outcome of the preliminary hearing. Had the court 
not found probable cause at the hearing, it would have had to 
dismiss the charges. See Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (3). However, the 
court did find probable cause and therefore scheduled a second 
arraignment for September 27. The court could not set a new 
trial date until Heaton entered his pleas at the second 
arraignment. Thus, because Heaton's trial date was continued for 
the purpose of accommodating his request for a preliminary 
hearing, and because a new trial date could not even have been 
considered until the second arraignment, Heaton may not include 
the 18 days between September 9 and September 27 as part of the 
120-day disposition period. 
Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to Heaton, the 
State had until January 19, 1995, to bring Heaton to trial. 
Although the court initially attempted to set the trial for 
January 19, 1995, it scheduled the trial beyond the disposition 
period because of the defense counsel's and prosecutor's 
scheduling conflict. Therefore, we must proceed to step two of 
our inquiry to determine whether continuing the trial to 
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 
"good cause" under section 77-29-1. 
A nearly identical issue was raised in State v. Bonny, 
25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970), wherein the initially 
scheduled trial date fell within the disposition period, but 
because defense counsel had a scheduling conflict the court 
rescheduled the trial for five days beyond the disposition 
No. 950238 8 
period. This court concluded that section 77-65-1, the 
predecessor to section 77-29-1,4 permitted the court to grant 
xx
*for a good cause shown in open court . . . any necessary or 
reasonable continuance.'" Bonny, 477 P.2d at 147-48 Jquoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1) . Thus, because the trial was 
rescheduled at defense counsel's request and to accommodate his 
schedule, this court held that the trial court had authority to 
grant such a continuance, which was "entirely reasonable and 
practical under the circumstances." Id. at 148. 
Because section 77-29-1(3) contains substantially the 
same language as section 77-65-1 and gives the court discretion 
to grant continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is applicable to 
the case at bar. The January 19, 1995, date initially offered by 
the trial court fell within the 120-day disposition period, and 
the court was therefore within its authority to grant a 
reasonable continuance under section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate 
defense counsel's schedule. In light of the other criminal trial 
both defense counsel and the prosecutor were engaged in, setting 
Heaton's trial one month beyond the disposition period was not 
unreasonable. Therefore, we hold that while the district court 
erred in its legal conclusions, extending the trial date to a 
reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in 
part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under 
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court correctly denied 
Heaton's motion to dismiss. 
We next address Heaton's argument that he did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to 
appointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of 
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). If an accused is 
indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel. See State 
v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986). However, the 
Sixth Amendment also guarantees an accused the right to self-
representation, "provided only that he [or she] knowingly and 
intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to counsel." McKaskle 
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984); see also Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 818 (1975). 
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must 
be jealously protected by the trial court. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated: 
4
 Section 77-29-1, enacted in 1980, replaced section 
77-65-1. 
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The constitutional right of an accused to be 
represented by counsel invokes, of itself, 
the protection of a trial court, in which the 
accused—whose life or liberty is at stake-
is without counsel. This protecting duty 
imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge of 
determining whether there is an intelligent 
and competent waiver by the accused. 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added). Because of the 
importance of the right to counsel and the heavy burden placed 
upon the trial court to protect this right, there is a 
presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be 
resolved in the defendant's favor. See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. 
at 464 (UN[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." (quoting Aetna 
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937))); United States v. 
Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986) (doubts concerning 
waiver of counsel must be resolved in defendant's favor). 
When a trial court is confronted with a defendant who 
either refuses to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or 
insists on proceeding pro se, the court must carefully consider 
the defendant's right to self-representation with his right to 
counsel. Nevertheless, before the court may permit the defendant 
to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court must 
conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty 
of insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made. In making this 
determination, the court must advise the defendant of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the record will 
establish that *he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.'" Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. 
United States ex rel. McMann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)); see Von 
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948); State v. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987). In addition, the 
trial court should (1) advise the defendant of his constitutional 
right to _the assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional 
right to represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, 
including the expectation that the defendant will comply with 
technical rules and the recognition that presenting a defense is 
not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that 
the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
No. 950238 10 
See State v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617 A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); 
see also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88.5 
This court stated in Frampton that a colloquy on the 
record between the court and the defendant is the preferred 
method of determining the validity of a waiver of counsel. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. The reasoning behind this conclusion 
is that the information necessary for the court to make its 
determination generally "can only be elicited after penetrating 
questioning by the trial court." Id.; see also Von Moltke, 332 
U.S. at 724 (X\A judge can make certain that an accused's 
professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made 
only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the 
circumstances."). In Frampton, we also stated that in the 
absence of such a colloquy, we will look at any evidence in the 
record to determine whether the particular facts and 
circumstances support a valid waiver. 737 P.2d at 188. 
However, in light of the foregoing discussion, this 
court is reluctant to assume the important responsibility which 
has been placed upon the trial court. After all, the trial 
court—having the benefit of questioning the defendant and 
observing his demeanor—is in the best position to determine 
whether the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel. In contrast, this court's proper 
role is to review the trial court's findings and conclusions and 
then determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
the defendant validly waived counsel. A meaningful review of the 
trial court can take place only after that court has conducted a 
meaningful inquiry of the defendant. Therefore, in the absence 
of such a colloquy, this court will look at the record and make a 
de novo determination regarding the validity of the defendant's 
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the existence of 
which we will address on a case-by-case basis. See Harding, 834 
F.2d at 857. 
In the case at bar, the trial court clearly did not 
advise Heaton of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
5
 In Frampton, as a guide for trial courts, this court 
quoted a sixteen-point colloquy recommended to the federal courts 
for use when confronting a prospective pro se defendant. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12 (citing Bench Book for United 
States District Court Judges, vol. 1, §§ 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal 
Judicial Center, 3d ed. 1986)). Once again, we strongly 
recommend that trial courts use that approach, as it is an 
effective means by which to determine whether the defendant has 
validly waived his right to counsel. 
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representation. The day before trial, during the hearing 
addressing Heaton's motion for new counsel, the trial judge 
stated: 
Now, with respect to counsel, you do 
have the right to represent yourself. I am 
not going to allow Mr. Caine's withdrawal at 
this point. Mr. Caine is a capable defense 
attorney. He is very familiar with the facts 
in your case. I am going to require that he 
remain on as counsel to assist you if you 
want the assistance. 
Mr. Heaton, if during the process of the 
Jury selection, and the defense that you want 
to present during the trial, you want to 
handle that on your own, you are free to do 
that. And you will be making that decision 
as you go. We will make a record of your 
decision to handle those matters on your own 
if that's your choice. 
My recommendation to you is that you 
rely on Mr. Caine's expertise and experience 
and have him help you. But you can make that 
choice. 
The court's cursory recommendation to Heaton to rely on 
defense counsel did not apprise Heaton in any way of the 
constitutional significance of the right to counsel and the 
consequences of waiver. The State argues that Heaton should have 
been aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation because on the day of trial, after the jury had 
been selected, the court strongly advised Heaton to allow defense 
counsel to cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch as Heaton 
would certainly not be as effective as defense counsel. While 
the court's advice was certainly appropriate, it addressed only 
one of the disadvantages of self-representation—i.e., not having 
experience and expertise in cross-examining witnesses. Moreover, 
the trial court had already determined that Heaton had decided to 
represent himself. As we have previously mentioned, before a 
trial court may permit a defendant to proceed pro se, the court 
must determine whether the defendant competently waived counsel 
at the time of waiver, not after. 
We therefore hold that because the trial court failed 
to advise Heaton, at a minimum, of the dangers and disadvantages 
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of self-representation, Heaton did not validly waive his 
constitutional right to counsel. The trial court erred in 
permitting Heaton to proceed pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a 
new trial. There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case 
which would justify our examination of the record and making a de 
novo determination as to whether Heaton knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. Moreover, because the 
waiver of counsel issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need 
not address Heaton's other arguments. 
We reverse Heaton's convictions and order a new trial. 
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, 
Justice Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's 
opinion. 
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